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In this paper I address the question of whether, and how, membership in a social group 
might have moral significance.  This question is a crucial precursor to the justification of 
what Will Kymlicka (1995) has termed group-differentiated rights; that is, rights we have 
by virtue of our membership in a particular social group, rather than universally.  We 
need to know why and how certain acts or circumstances harm or benefit individuals 
before we can argue for political action.2
 
  For instance, if we were to attempt to justify 
the exemption of a certain social group from a state law (Muslims from animal cruelty 
legislation to allow for Halal meat; Native Americans from anti-drug laws to allow for 
the smoking of peyote; or Sikhs from motorcycle helmet laws to allow for the wearing of 
turbans), or if we were to attempt to justify the provision of additional benefits to a 
certain social group (affirmative action for university entrance; differentiated welfare 
payments; or special representation in the legislature or judiciary) we would need to 
know what kind of impact these legislations (or their absence) have on individuals as 
members of social groups.   
This paper thus asks two questions: first, and most importantly, on what grounds would 
the state be obligated to treat some citizens differently on the basis of their group 
membership?  And second, is there a basis from which such justifications can be made 
that does not lead to the conclusion that social identities are merely handicaps that in an 
ideal world would be transcended?   This latter question in particular has been worryingly 
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overlooked in the literature defending group-differentiated rights, potentially leading to a 
situation in which group-differentiated rights are defended on grounds that, if taken to 
their natural conclusion, would suggest the transcendence rather than protection of 
identity. 
 
In order to provide answers to these questions I develop a typology to track the interests 
individuals have in group membership.  For the purposes of this paper I intend interests to 
mean broadly whether individuals are benefited or harmed, in this case as a consequence 
of their membership in the group.3  Answering the question of group membership’s moral 
significance in terms of interests provides the necessary foundation for considerations of 
group-differentiated rights, assuming we accept Joseph Raz’s (1986) influential account 
of rights as interests of sufficient strength to ground duties.  What I am considering here, 
then, is the first half of Raz’s equation.  I posit three different models for understanding 
how group membership matters in this regard, and thus how justification for particular 
group-differentiated rights might be framed: the nominal model, according to which 
groups are no more than a semantic fiction useful for advocating the meeting of universal 
human needs; the relational model, according to which the group is seen as a set of 
mutual-identification relations which impact upon self-respect; and the participatory 
model, according to which individuals coalesce around a set of shared practices that give 
meaning to their lives.4  I take each of these three models to offer a plausible pathway of 
justification for group-differentiated rights, since all three show that important interests 
are at stake.  Further, they are to be understood as providing differing perspectives on the 
interests at stake in any given issue, rather than as standing in competition with one 
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another.  For any rights claim, then, each of the models could be appealed to either 
severally or in conjunction.  
 
It is important to note, however, that it is only from the perspective of the participatory 
model that group membership is a benefit rather than a liability for group members.  This 
means that if we were to defend group-differentiated rights solely from the perspective of 
the nominal and/or the relational models, our justification would force us to concede that 
such rights are contingent goods whose benefits could be equally – if not better – 
achieved through the transcendence or eradication of identity groups.  In other words, the 
nominal and relational models see group membership as morally relevant only insofar as 
it is a potential site of disadvantage.  Whilst this conclusion may not be problematic for 
certain social identities (gender or race, perhaps) it appears far less benign when applied 
to other social identities, such as indigeneity, ethnicity, or religion.  Part of the purpose of 
this paper, then, is to tease apart these three perspectives in order to show when and why 
group membership is a benefit rather than a liability.  When these perspectives are not 
clearly differentiated – a situation I suggest is unfortunately common in the philosophical 
literature – we risk defending group-differentiated rights on the basis of arguments whose 
internal logic leads to a rejection of the value of group-membership. 
 
Before setting out the details of my account, it is worth clarifying very briefly its 
relationship to two of the more prominent typologies in the literature.  Kymlicka, in his 
highly influential book Multicultural Citizenship, sees the relevant distinction within 
group-differentiated rights to be between self-government rights, poly-ethnic rights, and 
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special representation rights.  Another prominent classification has been Jacob Levy’s 
eight-fold categorization of cultural rights.  Levy (1997) differentiates between 
exemptions, assistance, self-government, external rules, internal rules, 
recognition/enforcement, representation and symbolic claims.  The key difference in 
approach between these accounts and my own is that both Kymlicka and Levy’s 
distinctions track the nature of the good that the right guarantees, rather than the nature of 
the interest that the right protects.  To put it another way, both Kymlicka and Levy are 
concerned with differentiating the content of group rights, i.e. whether a given rights 
claim is best understood as falling within the category of self-governance, say, or whether 
it is rather a claim for state subsidization of group practices.  My account, by contrast, 
takes the relevant distinction to be between the various ways in which group membership 
might impact upon an individual’s interests, for example as a source of discrimination, or 
as a locus of self-understanding.  As such, my account distinguishes between various 
normative foundations for group-differentiated rights, which may well cut across the 
content-based categories of Kymlicka and Levy.    
 
2. THE NOMINAL MODEL 
 
The first perspective for understanding the moral significance of group membership is the 
nominal model.  This model identifies the interest members have in group membership in 
universal terms.  In other words, there are universal needs or interests that all individuals 
experience, and membership in a particular group can sometimes block individuals from 
accessing them.  From this perspective, the political instantiation of group-differentiated 
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rights does not track anything of significance in the group itself, but rather ensures 
members of that group are not prevented from realising their individual rights.  David 
Miller (2002: 183) describes this view succinctly: 
Belonging to [group] E is not a condition for having the right; all that 
belonging to E does is make securing the right of immediate and pressing 
importance, since as it happens it is only in the case of members of E that 
the state is preventing the right from being exercised.5
 According to the nominal model, group-differentiated rights identify individuals whose 
rights are routinely violated, and articulate the demand to meet their needs.  So we draw a 
circle around those individuals, so to speak, and, for nothing more than political rhetoric, 
announce that the group in question has the right in question.  The moral significance of 
group membership is thus purely contingent on political circumstances – membership in a 




We can explicate this claim with some examples.  By this reasoning, while we might say 
that indigenous peoples have a right to their ancestral land, or that disabled people have a 
right to access public buildings, all we are really doing is drawing attention to the fact 
that everyone has a right to property, or everyone has a right to mobility, and these rights 
are being denied to members of certain groups.  There is no non-trivial sense in which 
indigenous people, or disabled people, can be said to have interests divergent from, or 
additional to, the interests of all persons.  
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There is clearly an element of truth to the idea that, in the political sphere, group rights 
are frequently a call for the recognition of individual rights that are denied to particular 
peoples.  The Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for example, specifies 
rights such as freedom from discrimination, life, liberty and security of person – 
quintessential universal individual rights. The Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women can also be read as an attempt to extend universal 
individual rights to women, rather than specify rights that are to apply to women alone.  
(CEDAW includes, for example, the right to vote, to equal access to education, and to 
equal remuneration for work.)  Nonetheless, I resist the claim that the nominal model 
provides the only perspective from which to consider group-differentiated rights.  While 
the nominal model is a useful adjunct to the other models, it overlooks the complexities 
of harms that involve identity, with the consequence of preemptively dismissing 
potentially valid claims that cannot be accommodated within this individualistic model.   
 
Evidence of this problem can be seen by considering a potential group right – genocide – 
that Miller dismisses in passing as nothing more than an individual right:  
[Freedom from genocide is better seen] as a simple corollary of the right to 
life, a right possessed by all the individuals who make up the group 
threatened by genocide...  Nothing is gained by postulating a group right 
over and above the individual right (Miller, 2002: 183-4).6
I maintain that to interpret freedom from genocide as limited in this way is to profoundly 
misunderstand the nature and scope of the harms involved.  Genocide is the deliberate 
attempt to eradicate a people on the basis of some attribute they are seen to hold in 
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common.  As such, genocide involves the denial of the moral equality of all persons who 
hold that attribute.  What the nominal model fails to capture is that genocide denies the 
moral worth not only of the individuals killed, but also of all the individuals who see 
themselves as members of the group that is being targeted.  This subtly changes the 
nature of the interest the individual has in group membership.  While both the right to life 
and the recognition of one’s moral equality can be understood as universal interests at 
stake by virtue of one’s membership in a particular group, it is only in the latter case that 
how the group as a whole is treated bears on the protection of the interest.  This 
undermines the foundational premise of the nominal model that the group is nothing 
more than a semantic fiction, with the individual interest at stake only having a 
contingent relationship to membership in the group.   
 
Despite these reservations, the nominal model does serve as a useful perspective from 
which to defend certain group-differentiated rights.  Given the acceptance of the 
fundamental moral equality of all humans by even ardent sceptics of group-differentiated 
rights, the nominal model provides a simple and non-controversial justification for anti-
discrimination legislation, and potentially also for affirmative action policies.7  Its 
limitations, however, must also be noted.  Alongside its inability to adequately capture 
the types of harms that can occur to individuals on the basis of their membership in 
groups, as noted above, the nominal model also provides no grounds from which to 
defend the retention of social identities.  Since individuals are being denied goods on the 
basis of their perceived identity, the most effective way to secure access to those goods 
would be to work towards a world in which such identities were no longer salient.  The 
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nominal model gives us no reason to value group membership; instead, it points solely to 
the disadvantages that such membership can carry.  From the perspective of the nominal 
model, group membership is a handicap we should either shed or, if that proves 
impossible, counter through our political institutions. 
 
3. THE RELATIONAL MODEL 
 
In contrast to the nominal model, we can develop two further ways of conceptualizing the 
relationship between individual well-being and group membership.  The first of these is 
the relational model. This perspective takes as central the fact that members of a group 
share an identity, and so enter into a particular type of relationship with one another: one 
of mutual identification.  The moral significance of the group is explained with reference 
to the fact that actions directed towards a particular individual because of their 
membership in a social group can potentially harm all other members of the group.  The 
relational mode thus fills in the step overlooked by the nominal model.     
 
Under the relational model, the well-being of each member is interwoven with the well-
being of all other members.  If individuals are targeted by virtue of their membership in a 
particular group – for example, if certain people are sexually harassed because they are 
women, or physically assaulted because they are Jewish – then the attackers are making a 
statement regarding the worth of all members of that group.  Such attacks communicate 
that the defining features of the group make members unworthy of equal treatment and 
 9 
respect.  This denial of equality and respect thus extends to all who take themselves to be 
members of the group, and not just those who are the direct targets of the attack. 
 
The relational model assists our understanding of how harms inflicted on members of a 
group are felt by those beyond the immediate victims.  It helps explain, for example, how 
the removal of indigenous children from their families, as practiced in Australia until the 
1970s, was a grievous harm not just for those children removed and their families, but for 
all indigenous Australians.8
 
  This is because all Aborigines were in effect being told by 
the government that they were not worthy of raising their own children, the simple fact of 
indigeneity being deemed sufficient to prove incapacity as a parent.  Aborigines were 
taken to be less worthy than their non-indigenous counterparts, with this lack of worth 
publicly expressed through governmental policy.  Contra the nominal model, the victims 
of such acts extend beyond those who are directly persecuted to include all who self-
identify as members of the targeted group, since it is all who self-identify as members of 
this group whose moral worth is being denied.    
When an individual is harassed on account of her sexuality, denied a promotion because 
of her skin color, or her concerns dismissed because of her gender, the perpetrator is 
expressing disdain for all who fall within these social groups.  She is thus inflicting a 
harm on all who self-identify with that group.  One implication of this observation is that 
such harms are going to extend even to individuals who find themselves personally able 
to avoid harassment and discrimination.  They too are suffering disrespect, because one 
of the sources of their self-understanding is being publicly disparaged.  For example, if an 
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individual were to pass as other than how she self-identified (as some African-Americans 
did in the time of slavery, and as some gay people do today), she would be able to access 
the material benefits that were denied to others of their group, but would still be suffering 
the identity harm that accompanies the institutional disrespect directed at her group. 
 
We can also utilise the relational model to analyse more diffuse social phenomena such 
as stigmatizing portrayals of social groups.  While it should be relatively uncontroversial 
to assert that acts such as racial violence generate harms for all members of the social 
group (for instance by creating a climate of fear) it is much less obvious that individuals 
are harmed through public attitudes.  According to the relational model, expressions of 
disrespect directed at an individual by virtue of her membership in a particular group will 
both harm her directly, and harm all those who identify with the group in question.  
Ethnic stereotyping would by instances of expressing disrespect.  They are public speech 
acts containing presuppositions, which – if they are not actively contested – enter the 
communal language game as legitimate assertions about the subject (Langton and West, 
1999).  Jokes whose punch-lines rely on some derogatory characteristic of an ethnic 
group for their humour, for example, require the listener to accept the truth of the 
stereotype in order to enter into the shared practice of the joke.  Movies in which the plot 
revolves around the sole honourable Arab, or sole hard-working African-American, also 
carry presuppositions about these groups.  The narrative meaning is derived from positing 
these characters as exceptions, thus requiring the viewer to accept that the norm for each 
group is to be dishonourable or lazy, respectively.   
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Of course, much fiction relies upon such stereotypes in order to critique them, or at the 
very least to critique the social circumstances which bring them about.  My discussion 
here is not intended to imply that artistic endeavor should always be constrained to 
portray all social groups in a positive light.  Rather, I am concerned simply to draw 
attention to the potential damage caused by stereotypical depictions of social groups in 
fiction, particularly where this is not countered by either explicit or implicit critique.   
 
It is also important to be clear that identifying the interest at stake in these cases does not 
presuppose that political action should be taken.  In each case the interest must be shown 
to be of sufficient strength to justify the corresponding duty, and as such the strength of 
the interest necessary to justify a right will vary depending on the type of speech that 
would be affected.  Nonetheless, it is useful to have a clear picture of just how far-
reaching these harms can be, even if (as in the case of racist jokes) there is no 
presupposition that this will serve to justify political intervention. 
 
It could be objected at this point that the kinds of harms I assume to follow from such 
speech acts as racist jokes or stereotypical movies will not in fact eventuate, since these 
speech acts operate within the sphere of fiction, and thus merely require a temporary 
assumption of these beliefs that can be shed once the narrative is completed.    This is not 
the appropriate place to enter into a detailed discussion of belief-acquisition, so I will 
restrict my attention to one observation.   
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The point is simply this: even if we were to grant that the assumptions of inferiority in 
these narratives are intended and read as fiction, the mere fact of temporarily holding 
such views can lead to a belief in them.   The theory of impression perseverance 
advanced in the field of psychology supports this claim.  It demonstrates that subjects 
show a strong tendency to rely on evidence they have been given to make judgments 
about individuals, even after they have been explicitly informed that the evidence is false 
(Walster et al, 1967; Ross et al 1975; Ross et al 1977).  In the core experiments, subjects 
observed an individual performing a task, whilst being given feedback either praising or 
critiquing her performance.  At the conclusion of the task, the subjects were informed that 
the feedback they had been given was false, and in no way tracked the performance of the 
subject.  Nonetheless, when asked to evaluate the individual’s performance, the subjects 
reliably followed the information provided during the feedback.  Even more strikingly, 
Wegner, Coulton and Wenzlaff (1985) have gone on to show in similar experiments that 
subjects will rely on such information even when they are explicitly instructed before it is 
presented that it is false.  This has immediate relevance for the kinds of public assertions 
of inferiority under discussion.  Even though the presentation of inferiority or 
subordination is largely happening in the context of fiction, which we might think of as 
carrying an explicit instruction to discount the evidence it presents, the psychological 
studies suggest that by also telling us that people in our world have certain derogatory 
features, these media initiate and/or perpetuate belief in the inferiority of the social 
groups represented.   
 
 13 
I have been arguing that under the relational model, we can understand harms to 
individuals that come about through stigmatization of the social group/s to which they 
belong.  Thus far I have pointed to the relatively nebulous harm of disrespect.  We might 
ask, however, why this harm is of particular concern.  The first point to note is that 
disrespect in and of itself has a profound effect on well-being, and in particular one’s 
ability to form and pursue a life plan.  Rawls, for one, was quick to point out the 
debilitating consequences of internalizing a belief in one’s inferiority, noting that without 
self-respect, ‘nothing may seem worth doing...  All desire and activity becomes empty 
and vain, and we sink into apathy and cynicism’ (Rawls, 1999: 386).  It is only if we take 
our life to be of equal worth to others that we will come to see our goals as equally 
legitimate, and thus have the motivation to pursue them even when they conflict with the 
goals of others (such as pursuing a career that is competitive, or pressing one’s needs in 
the face of limited supply). 
 
While Rawls fully comprehends the importance of recognition, he significantly 
underestimates its necessary scope.  For Rawls, it suffices that ‘there should be for each 
person at least one community of shared interests to which he belongs and where he finds 
his endeavours confirmed by his associates’ (Rawls, 1999: 388).  The implications of this 
are highly dubious: it would mean that the level of public contempt in which a group 
were held would be irrelevant for an individual’s self-respect, since the other members of 
the group would provide sufficient affirmation of her goals and deeds.  This grossly 
underestimates the extent to which groups within a shared polity or social sphere 
influence one another’s self-respect.  Self-respect requires more than affirmation from 
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one’s group – it also requires, to some extent, that the group itself is afforded public 
respect (Taylor, 1992).   
 
Alongside the general harms of misrecognition, there are also a number of subsidiary 
effects of social disrespect that should be brought to attention.  Work in social 
psychology on stereotype-threat has exposed a variety of ways in which individual well-
being is harmed in virtue of being a member of a stigmatized group – in many cases, even 
when the individual in question rejects the truth of the stereotype.  These effects range 
from increases in blood-pressure (Blascovich, 2001), to impaired cognitive capacity 
(Steele and Aronson, 1995: Spencer et al, 1999; Schmader and Johns, 2003; Salvatore 
and Shelton, 2007), to damage to self-esteem and perceptions of autonomy (Ruggiero and 
Taylor, 1997; Verkuyten, 1998; Fisher et al, 2000). 
 
The harms involved in stigmatization are more than merely symbolic.  They affect 
agency, health, cognitive ability and self-esteem.  This is so even when individuals hold 
no belief in the accuracy of the stereotype.  Utilizing the perspective of the relational 
model thus provides a viable justificatory framework for many group-differentiated 
rights, in particular those centering on the accordance of public recognition to particular 
identities, practices or beliefs.  Even when the harm identified is not appropriately 
regulated in the public sphere, such as the harm accompanying racist jokes, an 
understanding amongst the public of the effects such actions have is vital.  While in these 
situations the relational model may not justify political obligations, it may well help to 
illuminate ethical obligations in the private sphere.   
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Finally, alongside these more diffuse obligations around recognition, the relational model 
can also serve as justification for policies such as affirmative action and special 
legislative representation.  This is because mutual identification leads to a concern with 
visibility.  If I identify myself with a particular social identity, then I cannot but be aware 
of the extent to which that identity category is represented in public space, for example in 
the narratives and histories that are given priority in the schools and universities, in the 
symbols of state, and in public institutions (Wolf, 1994).  If there is an absence in the 
public sphere of people who share my social identity, it will impact on the extent to 
which I can feel a part of the broader community.9
 
      
It should be noted, however, that this concern with the respect accorded, and the visibility 
given, to “people like me” need not carry much in the way of belief that “people like me” 
share any deeper commonality than simply the act of mutual identification itself, which 
may be motivated in large part by the ascription by others of the identity in question, and 
the discrimination that this may carry.  In particular, the relational model does not 
presuppose that justifications for recognition or affirmative action rely on recipients 
being members of communities who share cultural practices, since the relevant interest is 
freedom from discrimination or stigmatisation, and these can occur whenever there is a 
visible marker of difference.    While this is one of the strengths of the relational model, 
allowing as it does the extension of group-differentiated rights to gender and racial 
categories whilst avoiding their essentialization, it is also the reason for its limitations.   
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Often, when the justification for group-differentiated rights comes from an egalitarian 
perspective, the focus is on ways in which group membership undermines equal standing.  
Frequently, this takes the form of looking at how the decisions made by, and the 
institutions operating within, the state show disrespect towards groups.  But this 
perspective tends away from engagement with the issue of why group membership is 
itself a good.  Though it is only rarely acknowledged, this perspective taken in isolation 
leads to the conclusion that group membership is either an unavoidable evil whose effects 
need to be mitigated (we cannot stop people from seeing me as x, so we need to ensure 
that members of x are afforded respect), or is something to be transcended.10
 
   
We might attempt to counter this conclusion by pointing out that just as mutual 
identification can be a potential site of shame, so too it can be a potential site of pride.  
For example, I could feel pride in the achievements of women, and this could add to my 
self-respect as someone who identifies as a woman.  Likewise, someone could feel pride 
in the achievements of indigenous leaders, and this could boost their self-respect as 
someone who identifies as indigenous.  This argument will only take us so far, however.  
While it avoids the purely negative connotations around group membership that 
accompany the nominal model, it still provides no independent grounds for resisting 
assimilation.  If I take pride in the accomplishments of women or indigenous people 
because I self-identify as a woman or as indigenous, then how much more would my self-
esteem be boosted if I self-identified instead as human?  There is nothing to be gained 
from identification with particular social identities that couldn’t be gained to at least the 
same degree through identification with humanity as a whole.   
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Of course, mutual identification may be much thicker than the account I have presented 
above.  In such cases, the reasons for mutual identification go beyond a reaction to 
discrimination, and can be found in the shared meanings and perspectives that we 
commonly associate with cultural groups.  It is here that we finally encounter the interests 
individuals have in group membership as a benefit rather than a hindrance to their well-
being.     
 
5. THE PARTICIPATORY MODEL 
 
From the perspective of the nominal and the relational models, the significance of group 
membership lies primarily in its potential to be a source of disadvantage.  It is for this 
reason that these models, taken alone, provide no grounds for objecting to assimilation, 
and only contingent or temporary justifications for such group-differentiated rights as 
institutional representation, language provision, and legal exemptions.  It is unfortunate, 
then, that much of the literature defending group-differentiated rights primarily appeals, 
either explicitly or implicitly, to such arguments.  Too often no clear distinction is drawn 
between the need for non-discrimination, where this is understood as necessary for self-
respect, and the need to protect cultural practices per se.11
 
  When these two perspectives 
are blurred in this way, the justification for group-differentiated rights becomes likewise 
confused. 
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One notable exception to this generalization is the work of Kymlicka.  First in 
Liberalism, Community and Culture, and then again in Multicultural Citizenship, 
Kymlicka lays out a defence of group-differentiated rights that makes direct appeal to the 
benefit individuals gain from membership in cultural groups, arguing that culture 
provides a context of choice within which individuals can pursue and reflect upon their 
conception of the good.  Individuals thus have rights to culture and language because 
without these they could not lead fully autonomous lives.   
 
There are significant problems with Kymlicka’s thesis, and in particular with his 
conception of societal cultures (Carens, 2000: 52-87).  Nonetheless, I take it that the 
general direction of his argument – identifying the benefit that individuals derive from 
membership in groups – is a necessary adjunct to any theoretical discussion of group-
differentiated rights.  Furthermore, I consider Kymlicka’s central idea that there are 
practices that can only be pursued in common, and that these provide the orienting 
framework within which an individual’s life is pursued, to be a valuable one (provided 
we are careful not to make the same essentializing assumptions).   In what follows, I 
sketch one way in which a defence of group-differentiated rights from the perspective of 
the participatory model might proceed. 
 
Practices such as language, ritual and history provide the context within which the self is 
understood, providing the scaffolding upon which personal identity is built.   Importantly, 
such practices cannot be undertaken by isolated individuals, but gain their meaning from 
the fact that they are shared.  The practices I am concerned with would fall under Denise 
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Réaume’s label of ‘participatory goods’ (Réaume, 1988).  The notion of participatory 
goods enables us to articulate the difference between a group of individuals 
simultaneously partaking in an activity, and a group of individuals sharing an activity.  
While the former refers to an activity that two people happen to be pursuing at the same 
time, though perhaps in separate locations, the latter refers to an activity that two people 
are undertaking in partnership.  Participatory goods are shared in this way, reflecting the 
fact that they are co-operative endeavors. 
 
The participatory model is concerned with goods that gain their meaning through being 
shared by the social group.  Language would be the most obvious example, but we can 
also think of other cultural practices such as initiation ceremonies.  Such practices are 
meaningless without the participation of others and an appropriate context.  Were I to 
independently go through the motions of an initiation rite alone in my bedroom, for 
example, I would not have actually participated in an initiation, since what it is to be 
initiated is to play a determined role in a shared practice.  It is simply not something that 
can be enjoyed alone.   
 
It should be stressed, however, that in saying a participatory good cannot be enjoyed 
alone I do not intend to imply that it must always be undertaken in the presence of the 
group, where that is understood spatially and temporally.  Language, for example, is 
precisely the sort of thing that can be enjoyed alone in one’s bedroom.  Nonetheless, the 
meaning of language comes from its being a shared practice.  There must be a language 
community, whether physically present or not, for my enjoyment of it to be possible.  The 
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cultural saturation of the English language can make it hard for English speakers to 
comprehend the necessity of interlocutors for one’s language to be meaningful.  For those 
whose language is dying, or for those isolated from other speakers and media in their own 
language, however, it is very much a live issue whether they can enjoy the benefits of 
being part of their language community.  While on some level they could still speak and 
write in their language, without the possibility of a listener they would not be enjoying 
the participatory good of language.12
 
  
A similar point can be made with regard to other cultural practices.  Many rituals require 
mutual recognition within the group of the various roles that individuals play – think 
again of the initiate, or the medicine man.  In some cases, these roles extend beyond the 
celebration itself and become definitive of the self.  Without the mutual recognition that 
the fellow members of the community offer, that identity is in some important respects 
lost.  For example, we can imagine a medicine man whose entire community has been 
assimilated into the broader society.  While he could still go through the motions of his 
role, the structures of meaning from which his self-understanding is derived are absent.  
In all but the most trivial sense, he would cease to be a medicine man.   
 
This example may seem somewhat exaggerated – after all, most group-differentiated 
rights do not revolve around the needs of medicine men.  Nonetheless, it casts light on a 
phenomenon which is more diffuse, but no less important.  Many aspects of the self – 
how we understand what it is to be a son or daughter, what social meanings different 
occupations carry, or how the notion of romantic love fits into a life narrative – are 
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derived from the communities within which we live.  While these self-understandings are 
by no means inescapable, they are nonetheless constitutive of the self insofar as we do 
not choose to renounce or redefine them.   
 
The value of these participatory goods comes from their role in self-understanding.  What 
this means is that I can only stay true to myself insofar as I also stay true to those 
participatory goods that contribute to my self-understanding.  It is on these grounds that 
group-differentiated rights directed at protecting cultural practices may be necessary.  
This brings us to the further claim that membership in the group itself, as well as the 
specific practices within it, is a participatory good.  The shared meanings of the culture 
provide the background for understanding one’s place in the community, and in the 
world.  As such, I can only inhabit my culture, and enjoy its practices, insofar as there is a 
community of practitioners with whom I share the culture.  The participatory model 
provides a potential justification not only for the protection of particular cultural 
practices, but also for measures which ensure the viability of the community of 
practitioners.   
 
A caveat is important at this point.  Talk of the shared meanings of culture, and of the 
benefits of participatory goods, may give the impression that groups have a definite, 
holistic horizon of meaning, or that there are certain practices we can single out as 
integral to the group.  Both of these positions would be misleading.  The argument I am 
putting forward turns on the extent to which individual members of a group take certain 
beliefs or practices to be constitutive both of the group and of their self-understanding.  
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For any given individuals within a group, however, there may well be divergences over 
which practices they take to be constitutive, and which meanings they assign to their 
group.  Importantly, there is no definitive, objective answer as to whether they are 
correct.  Two individuals within a given group may diverge over whether a given practice 
is central to their self-understanding (for example, whether wearing the hijab is an 
essential aspect of being a female Muslim), or they may differ in what the significance of 
that practice is (whether it serves as a visible marker of faith, or as an act of solidarity 
with fellow group-members).   As such, the participatory model does not rely upon there 
being any practices that are constitutive of a group, if this is to be taken as meaning the 
group as a whole understands them to be constitutive.  This amorphousness, which is so 
characteristic of groups, is nonetheless compatible with the stance that participatory 
goods are connected to the well-being of those members for whom they are (at least in 
part) constitutive of self-understanding.   
 
Nonetheless, when it comes to moving from the identification of an interest at risk to the 
justification of a group-differentiated right, numbers are going to matter.  If only one 
member of a group takes a particular practice to be constitutive of her self-understanding, 
the grounds for granting a group-differentiated right are going to be weak (though there 
may still be cases, such as conscientious objection, where they will be sufficient).  While 
it is impossible to say with any precision what percentage of a group would need to 
consider a practice constitutive in order for a group-differentiated right to be justified, 
since this is a political question best addressed in context, a number of observations are 
warranted at this point.  The first is that pointing to a practice as being constitutive of a 
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group is, on my understanding, going to be a shorthand way of saying that the practice is 
central to the self-understanding of a significant proportion of group-members.  It does 
not imply that any practice is going to be definitive of ‘the group’, understood as a unit 
over and above the individual members.  Following on from this, my account allows for 
change over time in the practices that members take to be constitutive.  Since no practices 
are aligned with the group itself, but rather gain their meaning from the interpretations of 
current practitioners, my account avoids the reification of culture that can sometimes 
accompany appeals to participatory goods.   
 
These observations allow us to contest one of the central objections Brian Barry makes 
against group rights.  Barry opposes what he sees as the multiculturalists’ claim that a 
practice ‘simply in virtue of forming part of the group’s culture, […] is essential to its 
well-being’ (Barry, 2001: 252).  For Barry, appeals to culture are mere anthropological 
statements of the status quo, and thus carry no normative weight.  What he is missing is 
the fact that cultural practices may have a direct bearing on the well-being of individual 
members: insofar as their self-understanding is connected to the practices in question, to 
deny them access to the practice is to deny them expression of a part of their self.   
 
Barry further tries to defuse arguments from culture on the grounds of a reductio, and this 
objection must also be addressed if the participatory model is going to be viable.  What, 
he asks, are we to do about cultures whose central practices involve such heinous acts as 
cannibalism and genocide?  We need not follow Barry into these admittedly remote 
possibilities.  Many groups’ self-understandings are arguably noxious, particularly those 
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that rely upon the inferiority of other groups: adherents to the caste system, for example, 
or members of the Ku Klux Klan.   
 
There are two ways in which a response to this problem could be broached.  The first 
would be to argue that such groups rely on false beliefs, and since false beliefs are 
harmful, members would in fact benefit by having their group dissolved or transformed in 
some way.  I am sceptical of taking this approach, largely for pragmatic and epistemic 
reasons.   If we were to take it upon ourselves to rid individuals of their false beliefs, we 
would find ourselves with an incredibly large re-education program (most of us 
presumably holding at least some false beliefs).  We could attempt to narrow this 
programme by identifying false beliefs that are especially pernicious, and perhaps beliefs 
about others’ inferiority would make plausible candidates.  However, our stated 
motivation is to avoid the harms to the self – not harms to others – that accompany false 
beliefs, and it is far from clear that believing oneself to be superior is a grave harm to 
one’s well-being.   A far more plausible candidate would seem to be false epistemic or 
metaphysical beliefs – ones that fail to track the world in some significant way.  But how 
then could we justify interfering in people’s beliefs about social hierarchies, and not, for 
example, their beliefs about the world being created in seven days by a divine power, or 
being sung into existence by a giant rainbow serpent?  Most of us, I hope, would balk at 
the suggestion that these ontological and religious beliefs are so grossly harmful to the 
self that they should be taught out of existence. 
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Given these problems, I feel it is better to concede that stripping an individual of her 
group identity, whatever that may be, does in fact harm her.  As such, I hold that insofar 
as the practices of these groups form a significant part of their members’ self-
understandings, the members will be harmed through being denied access to the practices 
(or, we should add, access to the group itself).   
 
Of course, acknowledging the harm involved in interfering with such practices does not 
as yet tell us anything about the appropriate political response to these groups.  Even if 
we concede that group members are harmed through being denied access to their group’s 
practices, this still needs to be measured against the harms committed against non-
members.  The two alternative models of group membership discussed above offer some 
guidance here.  Where a group’s beliefs lead them to physically harm others, we can 
appeal simply to the violation of universal interests at stake, as the nominal model makes 
clear.  Where a group’s beliefs lead them to position others as social inferiors, we can 
appeal to the relational model to show that such actions impose significant harms on 
others.  Since we cannot only be concerned with the interests of the group members 
whose practices are at stake, but also with the interests of those the practices are directed 
against, my approach suggests the need to weigh the harms involved.  The harms of 
cultural exclusion will need to be weighed against the harms involved in denying basic 
needs, or of misrecognition.  In many (though perhaps not all) such cases, the appropriate 
response would be the suppression of just those obnoxious practices Barry is concerned 
advocates of group-differentiated rights are committed to protect.  The triple-lens 
approach I am putting forward, by contrast, allows us to both acknowledge the harm 
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involved in cultural suppression, and justify such suppression from within an identity 
sensitive framework.  
  
I noted above that the problem of obnoxious cultural practices must be addressed on a 
case by case basis.  In order to make the appropriate calculus, much will rest on the 
esteem in which the contested group is held by the broader society, and the corresponding 
pervasiveness of their ideas.  In the case of, say, the caste system, the belief in hierarchies 
of moral worth is clearly all pervasive and thus highly damaging to those occupying the 
lower rungs.  We could also imagine, however, a small group of bigots whose views were 
resoundingly rejected by the broader society, and whose targets received sufficient 
recognition of their worth from all other quarters that the relational affects were minimal.  
For example, we might imagine a minority group whose self-understanding was tied to a 
belief in the inferiority of white males (perhaps in response to a history of oppression), 
and whose shared practices involved shunning such individuals and eulogising about 
their inadequacies.  In a situation such as this, to interfere in the self-understanding of the 
group would cause more harm than would tolerating their discredited assertions of 
another social group’s inferiority.   This is because the harms associated with the 
relational model do not come about simply through being confronted with another who 
declares one inferior.  A broader social context reinforcing this perspective seems 
necessary for the impact on self-respect to take hold.  Since, at least in contemporary 
society, white males have consistent social reinforcement of their privileged position in 
society, it is highly unlikely that they will experience the psychological harms identified 
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in the relational model if they become aware of a marginalised group who proclaims their 
inferiority.   
 
6. CONCLUSION  
 
The three models I have put forward each provide a different argument for understanding 
the moral significance of group membership.  The crucial distinction between the three 
conceptions I endorse lies in how they conceive of the interests requiring protection 
through group rights.  For the nominal conception, these interests are conceived 
atomistically – group rights justified through the nominal model would protect universal 
human interests that have been denied to some due to their membership in particular 
groups.  Under the relational conception, by contrast, the interest requiring protection is 
the self-respect of group members, insofar as that is tied to their identification with a 
group.  The participatory model, finally, sees the interest to be protected in the enjoyment 
of common practices, such as language, culture, and history. Justifying group rights on 
the basis of this model would involve pointing to the connection between the interest in 
self-understanding, and access to the participatory goods that are necessary to remain true 
to this identity. 
 
It should be stressed again that these conceptions are not intended to be mutually 
exclusive.  There is no one way in which groups should be conceived for the purposes of 
determining the validity of rights claims, and nor is there a single way in which any 
particular rights claim would need to be cashed out.  Any given rights claim may appeal 
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to one or more of the models to illustrate the potential harms from which protection is 
required.  Returning to genocide, we can see that all three models could conceivably be 
invoked: the nominal model, as identifying the right to life that is being violated by virtue 
of the group membership; the relational model, as identifying the disrespect directed at all 
self-identifying members of the targeted group; and finally the participatory model, as 
identifying the loss of participatory goods that accompanies the decimation of a 
community.  Similarly, we might understand language rights in terms either of the 
relational model, whereby the refusal to acknowledge the presence of other languages is 
read as a demonstration of contempt, or of the participatory model, whereby access to 
one’s language is seen as a necessary aspect of personal identity.  These models thus 
provide a starting point for the justification of group rights.  They illustrate the 
multifaceted ways in which human interests are tied up with membership in social 
groups, ranging from susceptibility to discrimination, through to the need for a stable 
identity.  In doing so, a framework such as this provides a necessary starting point for a 
theory of group rights.  While not all of these interests will be sufficient to justify the 
imposition of duties that accompanies a right, achieving clarity on just what interests are 
at stake in group membership is a vital step in the process of justifying group rights.   
 
A final observation is necessary in closing.  I noted at the outset that, while the three 
models were to be understood as mutually sustaining, in the absence of the participatory 
model we would be led to the conclusion that identity was either a necessary evil or a 
harm to be transcended.  Throughout the discussion of the participatory model I made 
repeated reference to culture, which may give the impression that only ethnic or religious 
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groups have participatory practices, and thus only ethnic or religious groups benefit their 
members.  The participatory practices I refer to are, however, intended to be very broadly 
construed, including such practices as shared beliefs, attitudes or histories.  As such, it is 
entirely possible that the participatory model can shed some insight on groups that are not 
commonly associated with culture, for instance gender, sexuality, or even race.  The 
problem, though, is that this will require an identification and articulation of precisely 
what those shared practices are.  If we baulk at the idea that African-Americans share 
attitudes, or that women share a history, or that gays share beliefs, then we are returned to 
the problem that the only grounds we have for advocating differentiated rights for these 
groups construe identification with the group as a potential harm, rather than a benefit.  
We are thus left with a choice: either accept that certain social identities offer no benefit 
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1 This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Ethnicities.   
 
2 In saying this, I reject the idea that group rights can be justified on the basis of the intrinsic value of the 
group, absent any reference to the benefit it brings to individual members.  While space does not permit a 
full rebuttal of such positions, advocated most forcefully by Charles Taylor (1992), a few words are in 
order.  I maintain that even if it can be shown that groups do have intrinsic value, it highly unlikely to be of 
sufficient value to justify the imposition of the kinds of duties necessary to protect cultures.  For instance, 
 30 
                                                                                                                                                 
Taylor uses the intrinsic value of the culture to argue for a right to continued existence.  If taken seriously, 
this right would impose duties on individuals not to exit their culture, not to marry outside their culture, and 
to raise their children in accordance with that culture.  Such restrictions on individual liberty cannot be 
undertaken without appeal to the most serious of interests, and I do not see how the semi-aesthetic value 
Taylor appeals to can fulfill this role.    
3 While I do not offer a fully developed account of human well-being here, I take it that the kinds of 
interests I identify – self-respect, equal rights, self-understanding – are such that most accounts of well-
being would incorporate them.   
4 I should make clear at the outset that in talking about cultural practices, I do not presume these to be in 
any way monolithic, static, or uncontested.  As I hope will become apparent, defences of group rights do 
not need to appeal to any essentialist features of groups to gain traction.  The first two perspectives achieve 
this by disconnecting the justification of group rights from any features of the group at all; the participatory 
model does invoke features or practices of the group, but the value of these comes through their meaning 
for the individual members, and there is no presupposition that this meaning is going to be identical or 
constant for all members.  
5 Peter Jones (1999: 354) makes a similar point: “we might assert the right of Protestants to practice their 
religion or the right of homosexuals not to suffer discrimination.  However, relating a right to a 
characterstic that individuals share with others does not transform it into a group right.  Individuals may 
share their Protestantism or their homosexuality with others but still hold their rights as individual 
Protestants or individual homosexuals.  Indeed, we are likely to regard both of these rights as merely 
special instances of rights that are general to individuals – the rights of all individuals to enjoy freedom of 
religion and not to suffer discrimination because of their sexual orientation.”  It should be noted of both 
Miller and Jones that these passages are simply spelling out the position, and do not take this to be the only 
way in which group-differentiated rights can be framed. 
6 Miller here assumes that genocide involves the physical eradication of a people.  When I refer to genocide 
throughout this paper I understand it in accordance with the United Nations definition, which includes 
assimilation and the expulsion of a people from a state or region. 
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7 Even Barry, who is something of a bête noir for advocates of group rights, concedes that affirmative 
action may be necessary on grounds similar to those provided by the nominal model.  See Barry 2001, 
pp.12-13. 
8 For the official overview of these events, see Wilson, 1997.  For a conflicting view, see Windschuttle, 
2003.   
9 Not all identity groups actually seek visibility (for instance the Amish), and in these cases special 
representation rights would be inappropriate.    We should note, however, that even for these groups the 
lack of visibility corresponds with not feeling part of the broader community.  In this case, unlike for many 
others, it is a feeling of exclusion that members themselves perpetuate.  When considering self-excluding 
groups, though, care must be taken not to confuse cause with effect, since an understandable response to 
discrimination and exclusion is retreat from public space.  Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting 
this example.   
10 Nancy Fraser is one theorist who openly acknowledges this conclusion, when she advocates what she 
calls transformative rather than affirmative recognition.  See Fraser, 2003, pp.78-80.   See also Appiah 
1994. 
11 Charles Taylor (2002) often slips between discussion of the need for recognition, and demands for the 
protection of particular cultural practices.  Joseph Carens (2000) similarly elides between the two.  
12 We might think that, like some latter day Robinson Crusoe, there is always the possibility of writing for 
posterity.  It is worth noting, however, that even Crusoe could be reasonably sure that were his diary to be 
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